This essay argues that neuroeconomic research on financial decisions should attempt to focus on standard models that relate to the behavior being studied. It particular, it argues that a key organizing concept for such research should be the stochastic discount factor. Focusing on such models will help to focus the research as well as suggest profitable extensions of the research. The improved models will help us to better understand and craft legal rules and institutions.
Introduction
In this essay, I discuss some ways in which neuroscientific research applied to economics, commonly referred to as neuroeconomics, can inform the scholarship of financial decisions and legal rules relating to these decisions. Given the limitations on space of this essay, I cannot discuss anything like all of the neuroeconomic research that has been done in the last few years, even all of that which is of relevance to scholarship of financial decisions.
2 Therefore, this essay is a highly selective review of the research that I believe is useful to finance and legal scholars. The focus of the essay is on neuroeconomic research related to financial decisions and its relevance to legal scholarship.
A mainstay of many earlier survey articles in neuroeconomics was to have some discussion which can be referred to as the 'methodological' debate (e.g, Bernheim 2009; Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Glimcher 2011) . That is, neuroeconomic survey articles often contain or consist entirely of an existential argument for neuroeconomics as an area of study (e.g., Camerer, Lowenstein, Prelec 2005 and Camerer 2008) . However, at this point methodological debates are beside the point. A fairly large number of individuals and institutions are committed to pursuing neuroeconomic research for as far in the future as one can foresee. The question then becomes how best to focus this research.
Rather than entirely side-stepping these debates, it will profit us to consider two points that came into greater focus as a result of these methodological debates. The first is a more specific demarcation of what we might consider "neuroeconomics" as opposed to other types of research. Perhaps the most prominent critics of neuroeconomics, Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) stated that economic models make no assumptions about brain function. Of course, this is not strictly true in that economic models assume 2 that the humans are capable of performing optimization computations or something equivalent to them.
To understand the importance of the optimization assumption, imagine we discovered that the reason why humans exhibit downward sloping demand functions is the result of some process along the lines of Becker's argument (Becker 1962) that even a population of irrational consumers should have downward sloping demand curves. Such knowledge would certainly impact our economic models. Becker's argument was based on the idea that budget constraints in essence force a population of consumers who choose between goods at random to exhibit downward sloping demand curves. Becker claimed that this showed that many of the predictions of economics do not require rationality assumptions. However, many predictions of richer models of behavior such as expected utility models would not be confirmed if individuals behaved at random. We can see that economic models therefore generally make a number of implicit assumptions about decision processes. For example, economic models generally assume that preferences are stable in some way. If we learn that preferences are not perfectly stable, perhaps we should include the labile nature of preferences in our models.
We can use Gul and Pesendorfer's argument that economics makes no assumptions about neurological processes to help us differentiate "neuroeconomic" models from other types of models. Their argument suggests that we can consider that neuroeconomic models as those that explicitly include considerations of the decision-making process other than a straightforward optimization of some objective function. This would include bounded rationality models or any model that addresses cognitive, affective or other limits placed on the decision-making process. (Rubinstein 1998; Gigerenzer 2000) . Under this view, the scope of neuroeconomics is greater than models that include neuronal activity directly. Any model that postulates some of neurological limits to decision-making should be considered a neuroeconomic model, even though the neurological element of such models will vary.
3
Attempting to include cognitive, affective or other limitations to optimization of utility goes back at least as far as Simon (1957) . Simon argued that it is reasonable to model human decision processes as based on the use of heuristics rather than on the basis of formal optimization of some simple utility function. One goal of economics would then be to model these heuristics. One might note that including computational processes other than optimization of a standard utility function will likely result in models that do not have the elegant analytic solutions that have been an important part of economics. These models will likely need to make use of computational methods other than standard optimization methods. Fortunately, these computational methods have become common in economic modeling in recent years. (Stachurski 2009) The second point that became clearer due to the methodological debates relates to the kinds of neuroscientific research that will impact economics and the kind of economic work that should be incorporated by neuroscientists. For good or ill, modern economics mostly consists of the 3 mathematical modeling of economic activity. Of course, a thorough mathematical analysis includes statistical or econometric analysis to test the strength of particular relationships posited in models. Indeed, because mathematical relationships better lend themselves to empirical testing, econometrics may be a key driver in the increasingly mathematical nature of economics. In any case, economics is a discipline based on mathematical models that have been tested empirically. (Weintraub 2002) .
As a result, if neuroscience is to affect economics, as well as be affected by it, the conversation between the two disciplines will have to be essentially mathematical. While neuroscience itself is very commonly quite mathematical (Gabbiani and Cox 2010) , not all of the research, particularly that which is often considered neuroeconomic is mathematical in the way required by economics. In particular, the "outputs" of research need to be such that they can directly affect mathematical models used in economics. To put this more pointedly, in the words of Ernest Rutherford, "all science is either physics or stamp collecting." (Binks 1962) . That is, one is either attempting to describe the dynamics of the subject or is merely collecting interesting facts and naming items of interest. Merely observing which brain regions are involved in a decision process would be "stamp collecting" in this metaphor. Using information from neuroscience to inform our models of the decision-making process would be physics. Any particular work in neuroeconomics is likely to fall somewhere in between the extremes of "physics" and "stamp collecting."
To make this idea more concrete, one can argue that neuroeconomic studies showing that a particular neural region is involved when subjects make certain choices yield what may be thought of as essentially qualitative results. 4 While interesting, these qualitative results often tell us little directly about the decision process. 5 This can be contrasted with studies that test models that directly relate levels of neural activity in specific brain regions to particular decision mechanisms. For example, one might test a model that posits that the degree of activation in the region(s) of interest has some monotonic relationship with the decision. This allows us to either predict the decision from the activation or the activation from the decision. That is, the later type of research not only informs us about the location of the processing, but also something about the nature of the processing that is occurring.
Of course, the experiments that yield mostly qualitative results can still be useful. The nature of persuasion in economics, or in any discipline other than mathematics, is not always, if ever, based on apodictic demonstrations. (McCloskey 1994) The qualitative results may help us to conceive of why a particular process might be more likely without presenting additional statistical evidence of its accuracy. However, if neuroeconomics is to have a major influence on economics, it will have to be through models that relate to quantitative predictions of behavior resulting from neural activity.
4
To illustrate the distinction, albeit imperfectly, we can first consider one of the first prominent neuroeconomic studies that examined the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (sometimes referred to as the − model). 6 (McClure et al. 2004) This study showed that different brain regions had higher levels of activation when different time discounting choices were made. That is, when immediacy predominated, areas associated with the so-called prelimbic system were more active and when the standard exponential discounting best described the choices made, the prefrontal areas associated with executive control as well as the parietal cortex were more active. McClure et al. argue this evidence bolsters the case that a model something like quasi-hyperbolic discounting best describes the time discounting process people use. The explanation is that the brain has different regions that are used for discounting and anything that one can obtain immediately has greater salience than something that can be obtained only in the future.
One should note that the nature of time discounting is the subject of a vigorous debate. Other researchers (Kable and Glimcher 2010) argue that their experiments provide evidence of a different form of the discount function that is closer to standard hyperbolic discounting. 7 They also present evidence that the activation in the three regions 8 that had been thought to encode immediacy of reward actually encode something closer to subjective value. Kable and Glimcher found that their subjects did not behave in accordance with the quasi-hyperbolic model in terms of preference reversals. Rather they were more consistent with the hyperbolic model and even more consistent with a hyperbolic model that is not anchored on the present but at a time determined by the nearest point in time a payoff is possible. Still other researchers such as Sripada, Gonzalez, Phan and Liberzon (2011) found evidence that the three regions encode subjective value (consistent with the findings of Kable and Glimcher) but also find that the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex seem to be more active when subjects consider immediate rewards. Taken together these experiments support the assumption that the same regions (possibly even the same neural circuits) are involved in different types of processing at the same time. Interestingly, the choices made by the subjects in the experiment of Sripada et al. were well described by the exponential discounting model. This may indicate that the intertemporal decisionmaking process is much more complex than contemplated by any of these models. The purpose of 6 Under this model the method of discounting is such that current utility value of a stream of consumption in the future will be:
as compared to the standard model of exponential discounting which can be written as:
That is, in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, the difference between current consumption and consumption in the next period is more highly discounted than the differences between other consecutive periods (between the second period and the third period). 7 Kable and Glimcher (2010) propose a model which takes the form = , where SV is the subjective value of any given choice and − is the difference in time between the given choice and the choice which gives the payoff at a time closest to the present ("as soon as possible"). 8 The three regions include the ventral striatum, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex. 5 discussing these additional models is not to mediate the various claims. Rather it is to note that the nature of the neural processes involved in time discounting is a very active area of research.
For purposes of discussing the contrasting different types of research let us set aside these complexities and consider the McClure et al. study on its own. While their results seem to be helpful in arguing for a model such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, we note that even if we believe this model, the mechanisms they discuss are not the only way that quasi-hyperbolic discounting could have been instantiated. That is, the brain circuitry for this type of behavior could have been and indeed might be different. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting might have been instantiated in a single brain region or exponential discounting might have been instantiated in two different regions. Indeed, this same argument could be applied to any type of discounting model that one might come up with.
9 So while these neural activation results seem useful, they are in no way conclusive as to the proper structure of the model. Nor do they help us to formulate the discounting model in any way beyond what the behavioral data alone would have allowed. That is, observing that the processing occurred in particular regions is not necessarily dispositive as to the type of processing that is occurring, given the current level of knowledge of neural circuitry. That is, because the same neural regions can be associated with different mental processes, merely identifying an active region does not uniquely identify the mental process being utilized.
To illustrate how neuroeconomics can provide more direct evidence of a model and assist in parameterizing functional forms already postulated or potentially suggest new and better functional forms for modeling decision-making, we might contrast McClure et al. with a recent study that examined neural activation of subjects during an investment game. As reviewed more fully below in Section II, this study looked at the activity level in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum for realized gains as compared to unrealized or "paper" gains and found that this difference related to choices that imply realized gains are preferred to "paper" gains. (Frydman et al. 2013) Looking only at activations in these regions, one could predict that outcomes during the periods of lower activation were less highly valued than outcomes during the periods of higher activations. These predictions would have accurately forecast the actions of the subjects.
In particular, this experiment helps us to differentiate between models that assume that the disposition effect 10 is due to a misapplication of mean-reversion as opposed to differences in valuation of realized versus unrealized gains. 11 The Frydman et al. study reports what appears to be a higher valuation for 9 One can see this by considering the parallel versus single processing of equations by computers. Some mathematical process may be more efficiently dealt with through parallel processing, however in general almost any type of process can in principle be done by a single processing unit. This follows from the Church-Turing Thesis. Church (1936) While this thesis cannot be proven, mathematicians nearly universally accept it. Davis (1965) 10 The disposition effect is the name of the phenomenon that investors are more likely to sell an investment that has experienced an increase in value and retain one that has experienced a decrease in value. (Odean 1998) 11 If one believes that returns are uncorrelated over time, then investments that have made gains should be sold with equal frequency as those that have lost value. However, if you believe that investments which have made high returns are likely to make low returns and vice-versa (i.e., that returns exhibit mean-reversion), then it would make sense to be more likely to sell investments which have experienced gains and continue to hold those which have experienced losses.
6 realized gains relative to unrealized gains. As discussed more fully below, the evidence from this experiment appears to support a realized utility model (Sheffrin and Statman 1985) . 12 Of course, as we saw with the prior discussion of models of time discounting, there likely is a great deal more to the story that we can derive from this one experiment. Indeed, other brain regions certainly affect these calculations. In addition, the study's results do not tell us exactly what calculations are made in the process of valuation, although it does give some indications. As with nearly every subject discussed in this essay, a lot more research will likely have to done before we can claim to understand this behavior.
The contrast of the two types of experimental research-fact discovery and theory testing-, while illustrative, is not perfect. Both types of studies help us to understand the decision-making process. Indeed, there is much overlap in the type of analysis in these two types of experiments. However, we would argue that the work along the lines of the study of realized gains is of more direct value because it presents stronger evidence for the hypothesis it is used to test than does the evidence from the experiment concerning quasi-hyperbolic discounting. One should note that in large measure, the reason for the difference in results is the difference in the nature of the hypotheses the two papers were testing. The McClure et al. study examined a theory that predicted only that two different processes were occurring, while the Frydman et al. study examined a model that makes predictions about the difference in the level of activations within the same system.
Currently, neuroeconomic research is at its most rigorous and immediately useful when its focus is on what we will refer to as short-term decision-making. By the term "short-term decisions" we mean those decisions where all of the information necessary for the decision is revealed to the subject during the experiment and the decision is made during the course of the experiment. Long-term decisions would then be those decisions where at least some element of the decision and the processing of the decision is made outside of the structure of the experiment. Short-term decisions, such as a choice of what to consume immediately are likely more susceptible to analysis by laboratory methods than longer-term decisions. That is, neuroeconomics is currently more able to give insight into choices made by subjects during an experiment than about the retirement planning of these same individuals.
The short-term versus long-term decision problem is a standard one for experimental economics. If some part of the decision is not observed during the experiment, we have likely lost some degree of understanding over what determined that decision. This is a variant of the problem of external validity of the results obtained in the lab. That is, even if we can describe the decisions individuals make in the lab perfectly, it is not clear what this tells us about decisions made outside the lab. This issue of external validity has been an important one for experimental economics since its inception. 13 This problem is even more acute for neuroeconomics because it is attempting to model neural processes explicitly, and not simply decisions, and so the issue becomes more obvious. As a result the time scales under study in 7 neuroeconomics often are even shorter than those utilized in traditional experimental economics. Our ability to extend the results from the activity that occurs at a time scale of about a second (which is typical in fMRI studies) to decisions taking hours to perhaps weeks becomes less obvious. While the hope and belief of all researchers in both experimental economics and neuroeconomics is that we are discovering relevant information, whether what we find is relevant must be demonstrated outside of the lab.
Of course, it is not the case that neuroeconomics has nothing to say about long-term decisions. Neuroeconomic research has given us some important information about the neurological bases of longrange planning. For example, studies of individuals with various types of brain injuries and the deficits they seem to suffer are an important source of information about this (Bechara, Damasio and Damasio 2000) . Unfortunately, this does not necessarily directly help us model behavior. In order to use this information to model behavior, knowledge that particular neural regions are involved in insufficient, as the same region can be involved in a number of different processes. We need to understand more fully what type of processing occurs in these brain regions as the particular decisions we are studying are being made. Similarly, as discussed in the next section, knowing that success as a trader of financial assets appears to be correlated with a certain genetic profile does not tell us what is different about the decision process of the individuals who possess that profile. In Section II, we discuss how such research can be used to suggest what may be occurring in long-term decision-making. Because, as mentioned above, the evidence from research on longer-term decisions is less strong than it is for short-term decisions, our conclusions about the neural processes involved in long-term decisions must, by their nature, be more tentative.
Importantly, to some degree, the current study of neuroeconomics is limited by our degree of both temporal and spatial resolution of neural activity. 14 If we could somehow keep track of every cell in the human brain and be able to process the information we obtain at the cellular level then we could truly understand how decisions are made. 15 As we discuss below, the temporal differences in decisions can matter. A fair amount of evidence suggests that the same neural structure can be used for different decisions at the same time, with different latencies in the process (Schultz 2009) . One can analogize this to Fourier modes in the brain activations as discussed more fully in Section II. D. 16 This might significantly complicate our models of decision-making.
Unfortunately, neuroeconomics faces a problem much like that in the old joke about the drunk who has lost his keys. 17 That is, the questions we wish to answer are not the questions we can answer easily.
However, science progresses by focusing on small answerable questions. (Weisskopf 1972) We then 14 For example, processes that occur at faster time scales than we can measure escape our notice. 15 This is not merely a detection problem, but also a storage and computing problem given the size of the human brain. 16 For an accessible discussion of Fourier modes, see chapter 3 of Haberman (1998) . 17 The old joke goes: A drunk loses his house keys. A policeman comes upon the drunk looking for his keys under a lamppost. He starts to help him look for his keys. After a few minutes of an unsuccessful search, the policeman says to the drunk, "are you sure you dropped your keys here?" The drunk responds "I lost them over there, but the light is better here." 8 hope that these answers allow us to progress towards larger questions. Neuroeconomics, like any new area of research needs to focus on the questions it can answer with the hope that the answers to these will build up to allow us to answer the questions in which we are truly interested.
One thing that is clear from the study of the neural mechanisms of decisions is that the brain uses a variety of modules, each of which have separate tasks. The hodology of these interactions will clearly be a focus of future research. To illustrate this, some of the earliest work in neuroeconomics indicated that some neural ensemble in the orbitofrontal cortex appears to create some warning about potential adverse consequences. Based on many years of studying individuals with brain lesions, decisions appear to require processing in multiple areas to achieve optimality (or at least what we might term as better decisions) (Bechara, Damasio and Damasio 2000) . While a significant body of evidence suggests that decisions involve integration of conflicting areas (Bossaerts, Preschoff and Hsu 2009 ), the precise nature of these interactions is unclear.
As mentioned previously, this essay will be highly selective and even opinionated in its discussion. This essay will focus on research concerning financial decisions. This is in part because so much research has been done in this area, and because the work on financial decisions has a natural and direct relevance to law. I hope that this essay illustrates how neuroeconomic work is not only relevant but also essential to understanding human decisions.
Decisions are at the center of legal scholarship, particularly that of law and economic scholarship.
Research in law and economics seeks to understand the impact of laws and other systems of rules by utilizing the methods of economics. To the extent neuroeconomic research affects economics, at a minimum it will likely affect legal scholarship in the area of law and economics. Furthermore, the manner in which individuals make decisions is of clear relevance to legal scholarship in general. Some applications of neuroeconomics to legal scholarship particularly for taxation and regulation of financial markets are discussed at the end of the essay.
I. The Neural Basis of Financial Decisions
Researchers have done a fair amount of intriguing work on the neurological basis of financial decisions. Financial decisions involve choices between different investments. Investments are not commonly thought to be valuable in and of themselves, but their value derives from an increase in the ability of the investment owners to consume in some future period. Berns and Montague (2002) Different investments are distinguished by differences in their return and their risk, however that risk is defined.
Standard financial models are based on the idea that individuals make investments so as to maximize returns relative to the risks undertaken. We can then see that under standard economic models, financial decisions are in most ways not any different than decisions made in other domains. Individuals simply make choices that maximize a utility function. The complications that arise in financial models involve the form that the constraints on risk-taking assume as well as the process of the formation of expectations based on prior behavior of assets.
A large number of models in the academic literature on finance are not strictly based on assumptions about the utility functions of individuals. These models, such as the Fama-French model 18 (Fama and French 1993) , are based on statistical observations that have been found to correlate with the behavior of markets better than models that are built up from utility assumptions. Cochrane (2005) These statistical models essentially eschew the choices of individual actors and use the structure of the markets themselves to determine the dynamics of prices. Neuroeconomics is unlikely to be able to address these models to any significant degree in the near future as they are not explicitly based on individual perceptions and behavior. Therefore, neuroeconomic work should focus on models derived from individual utility.
a. Stochastic Discount Factors
Before entering a discussion of the neuroeconomic research as applied to finance, it is useful to discuss the financial model that we will use as the framework for analyzing neuroeconomic work. Standard financial economics textbooks (Cochrane 2005 ) often start with a two period model, 19 which can be expressed as:
Here, is the utility of the individual at time t, is the utility of current consumption, is the utility of future consumption and and are the time indexed consumption amounts. is the discount factor assuming that period t+1 consumption is discounted relative to current consumption. Note that in this setup, there is no assumption that the consumption utility function is the same in the two periods. This setup of the model is more general than in standard textbooks which generally restrict (•) = (•) . This generality in equation (1) is designed to allow us to include features such as habit formation or other changes to the utility function that might occur in the two periods. As is standard in economics, we assume that the decision to consume in the first period as opposed to the second will have to be such that the marginal utility to current consumption must be equal to the discounted marginal utility from consumption in the second period. This means that if the price of a unit of the investment in the current period is and the payoff of the investment in the next period is then we have a first order condition:
Rearranging gives us:
This is sometimes written
The expression is often referred to as the pricing kernel or the stochastic discount factor. This pricing kernel translates "true" probabilities into those that can be used to price assets in the market. 20 We can see that this factor includes the discount for time, , as well as other features of utility functions like risk-aversion (because the shape of the utility curve will determine marginal utility), which enter into the formula through the ratio of marginal utilities, that is
We should note that we have not assumed that is a particular variable. Indeed, it could even be a vector of inputs (e.g., different consumption goods, or even lagged consumption from earlier periods), as long as the range of the utility function is the set of real numbers, or some subset of the real numbers. In addition, the utility function could assume almost any form, including wealth maximization as well as cumulative prospect theory.
Equation (2) is one of the fundamental equations of finance for determining the price of an asset. It is quite easy to extend this analysis to a multi-period model of the form:
Here the payoff in each period is (which one can conceive of as the dividend paid in that period). We can note that each period has its own discount factor and its own comparison to current period consumption.
21 Therefore, this model can accommodate standard methods of time discounting such as exponential or hyperbolic discounting. Indeed, in this framework almost any sequence of time discount factors is allowed. 22 For stochastic discount factors to exist we need only assume the existence of a differentiable utility function and that it is sensible to talk about a single price for an asset at any given time, sometimes called the law of one price. (Cochrane 2005) In this setup, we can see how neuroeconomics may be of use to academic finance scholars. A great deal of neuroeconomic work attempts to analyze the sequence of time discount factors ( , , … ). (McClure et al. 2004; Kable and Glimcher 2010) As discussed earlier, some of this work has lent strength to a quasi-hyperbolic series of discount factors, while other works seems to indicate different models might be more accurate. In addition, the nature of the sequence of utility functions , , , … has also been the subject of research (see e.g., Frydman et al., 2013) .
One interesting consequence of writing the pricing model using the stochastic discount factor is that we can see that both the time discounting sequence and the utility growth sequence are under the expectation operator. Most neuroeconomic research has considered these two sequences (time discount and utility growth) as having independent evolutions. However, if the evolution of the utility growth sequence is somehow related to the evolution of the discount factor, this could add a dimension to our modeling of financial decisions but likely at the sake of losing a significant degree of analytic tractability resulting in the necessity of utilizing computational methods to solve such models.
Another important feature of the stochastic discount factor is best understood by considering the representation = [ ]. Here, can be thought of as the Radon-Nikodym derivative, 23 which converts the "true" expected value to that which gives us the price observed in the market. Standard financial economics models assume that investors are utilizing the "correct" probabilities in calculating the expected value. But if individuals calculate the probabilities incorrectly, then we should include these probabilistic errors into the expected value we use to price assets. Doing this results in what is sometimes referred to as the behavioral stochastic discount factor. (Shefrin 2008) This type of model would add a term in the stochastic discount factor. If the probability density function for the "true" probability of the payoff can be written as:
and if the probability density function as used by the market to price the asset is:
then if we add the term:
we now can write a stochastic discount factor to price assets based on the probability measure actually used by the market. 24 The new equation would become:
The new stochastic discount factor is then:
Much of the financial economics literature has been devoted to attempting to understand the nature of the stochastic discount factor and its dynamics. (Cochrane 2005) Many scholars believe that understanding the stochastic discount factor is viewed as the key to understanding the dynamics of asset prices. Under this model, some element of the stochastic discount factor must change in order for the price of the asset to change. One can then think about neuroeconomic research on financial decisions as attempting to say something about the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel and the degree to which it is shaped by the neural mechanisms. To the extent that neuroeconomic work on financial assets is relevant to academic financial models, it is almost certainly directly related to the stochastic discount factor or some equivalent construct.
In attempting to relate the price observed in the market to other phenomena, the discussion so far has implicitly assumed that all individuals essentially share the same stochastic discount factor. However, this is absurd. Individuals most certainly differ in their estimates of probabilities, in their risk aversion and in their time discounting. So while the notion of a single stochastic discount factor for the entire market may be a coherent concept, it is not necessarily clear how one could derive this from individual stochastic discount factors. (Shefrin 2008, chap. 14; Constantinidies and Duffie 1996) . This is similar to the standard problem in economics that unless preferences take on a certain form, known as the Gorman form, aggregating them into a demand function is essentially an intractable problem. (MasColell, Green and Whinston 1995, chap. 4). Nonetheless, if certain phenomena correlate with changes in the stochastic discount factor of a large segment of market participants, it would seem reasonable to attempt to explain pricing moves by these factors even though we may not have a rigorous proof of what the precise effect should be on market prices.
The foregoing has essentially been an argument that, to the extent neuroeconomic work wishes to impact financial models in a direct way, it should be structured to say something about the form of the 24 We are assuming here that Π( ) is absolutely continuous in relation to ( ). That is, the value of Π( ) is never zero unless the value of ( ) is also zero. stochastic discount factor (or some equivalent model in financial economics). As a consequence, researchers investigating particular phenomena from the perspective of neuroscience should be mindful of how their research informs our understanding of the stochastic discount factor. That is, they should consider how the phenomenon under study affects the perception of probabilities, time discounting, risk aversion or some combination of these.
b. Heterogeneous Behavior of Experienced versus Inexperienced Actors in the Market
Some of the earliest work that can be termed neuroeconomics dealt with the reaction of traders of financial assets to market price fluctuations. For example, Andrew Lo and Dmitry Repin (2002) looked at the physiological responses of traders to real-time trading events. They discuss how the trading decisions they studied were likely based on what the authors refer to as intuition as opposed to reflective decisions due to the amount of time in which these decisions had to be made. For a large percentage of active market traders, such as those trading bonds, currencies, futures, options and stocks, trading decisions have to be made within a matter of seconds to minutes. This is likely not enough time for deliberative decisions based on all currently available information. Therefore, decisions to buy or sell financial assets at the current market price are based to some significant degree on unconscious processes where neuroeconomics might be able to provide some significant explanatory power.
Lo and Repin's main focus was to compare the physiological responses (blood pressure, skin conductance, etc.) of younger traders to those of more experienced traders. They found that, except for very high volatility events and periods when the bid-ask spread changed, the more experienced traders had lower physiological responses than less experienced traders. The authors argue that this indicates that at some level experienced traders processed the information they observed in the market differently than did the less experienced traders.
The lower physiological responses of experienced traders have many possible explanations. Lo and Repin discuss how it might be that more experienced traders simply have to exert less cognitive effort in tasks that they have performed for years. Because the more experienced traders have experienced similar situations in the past, they know how to react. Therefore, experienced traders' decisions do not take as much cognitive effort as they would have earlier in their careers. The fact that not all situations resulted in lower responses by the experienced traders indicates that the automated responses explanation is not the full story. Recall that two types of events were correlated with elevated physiological responses in experienced traders: changes in the bid-ask spread and the highest volatility events. The bid-ask spread for any asset is set by market insiders, who are the most aware of market movements. A change in the spread then indicates that these insiders believe that there has been a change in market dynamics. Similarly, very high volatility events may indicate a change in market dynamics as well. Therefore, both of these events can be taken to indicate that market behavior may be changing and attention must be paid to it.
Unfortunately, Lo and Repin do not report the relative performance of the experienced versus inexperienced traders during the period under study. They argued that this is too difficult because it is 14 not possible to compare the amount of risk undertaken. Furthermore, the intraday volatility that they would have been able to observe is not necessarily indicative of the risk the traders were taking on. Volatility itself has a volatility. (Tsay 2010 ) As a result, it may be that on any given day, low volatility assets might experience higher price volatility than assets that normally have higher price volatility. It is difficult to draw conclusions from what is effectively a sample size of one (that is, only one day's worth of results were studied). This is unfortunate because if the more experienced traders were taking on less risk, this might also explain the brain activity. For example, if more experienced traders took on much less risk than inexperienced traders, this might explain why it took a very high level of volatility for them to experienced elevated responses. Lower risk positions might not present significant risks unless the market is highly volatile. For example, if the experienced traders were more secure in their jobs, they may not have felt the need to take on as much risk and the fact that they didn't take on as much risk might explain their lower brain activation.
Keeping these caveats in mind, this study can be viewed as evidence of the effect of experience on the use of information. That is, both experienced and inexperienced traders were exposed to the same information set (commonly denoted Ω or sometimes ℱ in the academic literature). Yet, the investment professionals with different levels of experience reacted differently to this information. Therefore, the flow of information is not necessarily the key to determine how investors will view the market. A natural question is whether experienced investors are simply those who have better models to begin with and who survive in a Darwinian process or whether these professionals develop better models over time. Some research that might bear on this question is discussed below.
Interesting related work involves differences in investment strategies between experienced and inexperienced fund managers. Inexperienced fund managers were found to be more likely to invest in the stocks whose values crashed in the Internet bubble of the late 1990s. (Greenwood and Nagel 2009 ). This provides some evidence that those who are experienced with financial markets behave differently than those who are not. One does need to be mindful of the differences between the decisions being made in the two studies. While the decisions of a mutual fund manager and a trader both concern which investments one should make, as well as how long one should continue to hold these investments, the position of mutual fund manager is different in many ways than that of a trader. The most important difference is the time frame in which these decisions are made. The trader has to make decisions essentially second-by-second, while mutual fund managers generally have days to weeks to make decisions. This may be a crucial difference in attempting to understand decisions made by the two groups.
We can connect this research to the stochastic discount factor by considering the difference between experienced and inexperienced investors. That is, do we believe that the different behavior observed affects the perceived probabilities, ( ), the discount factors, , or risk aversion,
Greenwood and Nagel argue that learning theories are consistent with their evidence, which would imply that experience alters perceived probabilities. Perhaps inexperienced traders require more cognitive effort to trade because they are still learning probability distributions that accompany particular types of market dynamics. As discussed in the next section, research on the formation of asset pricing bubbles bears on this question and so before discussing this further, we will first consider the research related to bubbles.
c. Asset Pricing Bubbles
In financial transactions, individuals and institutions attempt to outsmart the market, or at least to not be outsmarted by the market. That is, to some degree decisions concerning investments in financial markets are dependent on beliefs about how other actors in the markets will behave. Under classical finance theory, if markets are efficient and all actors believe markets are efficient, then asset price bubbles should not form. However, while asset price bubbles can generally not be proven to exist, casual empiricism would suggest that they do.
The discussion of the different processing styles of experienced versus inexperienced traders relates directly to a great deal of work done on the causes and dynamics of asset pricing bubbles. A great deal of work in experimental economics explores the generation of bubbles as well their sustainability (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988) . One common theme in this work is that experience with the particular market being observed seems to reduce the likelihood of bubble formation as well as reduce the longevity of the bubbles that do arise. (Hassam, Porter and Smith 2008) . We see that generally subjects learn not to enter into bubbles after having seen asset pricing bubble formation three times in the market in question. 25 Other work in which the participants in the experimental market are a mix of experienced and inexperienced investors has shown that if as few as one third of the investors are experienced (that is, they understand the problem of asset price bubble formation), then asset pricing bubbles do not form in these markets (Dufwenberg, Linquist and Moore 2005) .
Some work has attempted to investigate how neural mechanisms affect asset price bubble formation. Knutson (2008) showed erotic pictures to a group of males who then participated in an experimental asset market. They found that asset-pricing bubbles were more likely to arise following exposure to these erotic images. A recent similar experiment was conducted where subjects were shown one of three types of videos: exciting, neutral or fearful. They found that exposing subjects to exciting videos resulted in larger asset pricing bubbles. (Lin, Odean and Andrade 2012) . These experiments indicate that activation of certain neural systems, likely the dopaminergic system, which is involved in sexual attraction (Fisher, Aron, and Brown 2006) , may make bubble formation more likely. It is not clear how these effects should be included in a financial market equilibrium with other traders who have not been exposed to this type of material. That is, given the experimental results on experience, the market dynamics are clearly complex, and applying these findings to the operation of financial markets outside the lab is difficult at best. One obvious difference is that erotic pictures are not flashed to all market 25 It appears that the experience is very domain specific. In the experiments conducted in Hassam, Porter and Smith (2008) , the subjects were corporate executives participating in an on-campus program (Arizona Executive Program). The subjects were from a variety of different industries. The experiment still resulted in asset price bubbles in much the same way that has been observed with college students as subjects. We should note that most of the executives were not from the financial industry and would likely have seen bubbles in asset markets only indirectly rather than directly. Therefore, experience in business in general does not prevent the formation of asset bubbles.
participants in the field immediately before an asset pricing bubble begins. Indeed, these bubbles tend to form over a period of weeks, months or even years. Clearly not all market participants are subject to the same stimuli over the entire period. Extending the research to markets in the field is therefore a very useful area of research.
We should note that the environments in these experiments generally differ from those in financial markets outside the lab in many additional ways that are likely to be important. In financial markets, there is a constant inflow of information outside of the movement of the prices themselves, such as political and other world events. Much of this information will have uncertain effects on prices. Indeed, sorting out the relevant from the irrelevant information is one of the biggest issues for financial decision-making. Because market actors are not able to process simultaneously all available information that is potentially relevant to prices, investors will focus on particular sets of information. Different investors will focus on different sets of information. Even those investors utilizing the same information will have different models for processing the information they have. Therefore, the level of complexity in financial markets is a great deal larger than it is in experimental markets.
With regard to the last point, some interesting work has been done on information transmission in the market. Bruguier, Quartz, and Bossearts (2010) found that the ability to read signals from market insiders is correlated with performance on a test of the ability to formulate a theory of mind. This experiment tested the ability of uninformed traders to discern information from transaction prices and order flows. They found that informed traders conveyed information to uninformed traders through their trading actions. The authors argue that this may make the efficient market hypothesis more reasonable, because this would clearly be one mechanism that might result in efficient markets. Evidence such as this might help us to understand the common finding that financial markets can be highly micro-efficient (that is, they incorporate current information into stock prices well) but macro inefficient (they do not forecast macro events very well). (Jung and Schiller 2006) . The findings of Bruguier et al. indicate that information can be effectively transmitted to the market without the information itself being transmitted. Of course, the type of information conveyed by such moves is likely to be of only short-term relevance because, in the long run, essentially all information is revealed to market actors.
How might we relate the research on asset price bubbles to stochastic discount factors? One possibility is to conclude that the stochastic discount factor has been formulated incorrectly. If individuals generally do not make infinite calculations, but rather do so only for finite time periods (and perhaps for only a few periods) then the possibility of bubbles exists. As discussed before, under standard finance theory, asset-pricing bubbles essentially should not form. (Cochrane 2005) . In order for bubbles to form, individuals would have to assume that the dividend-to-price ratio will have to grow without limit as time goes on. Consequently, asset price bubbles would form only if market actors believe prices will grow faster than the required return forever. Since this would be essentially impossible, bubbles should never form (Cochrane 2005) . We can note that this argument assumes that the stochastic discount factor is of the form specified in equation (3).
One can see that the classic stochastic discount factor model assumes that individuals include an infinite number of terms in their stochastic discount factor. Under this assumption, the argument against rational bubbles works only if individuals believe that the price will continue to increase forever, and if not, then rational bubbles are not possible. However if individuals make calculations for a finite number of time periods, this conclusion does not necessarily hold. That is, if the prices are not based entirely on beliefs about future values, but also second-order beliefs about other investors' beliefs, the price might rise quickly within the time horizon of the investor. In that case, investors might believe the market price will increase rapidly for some period and if each believes that he can sell the asset before the bubble collapses, then bubbles might form. Investors would then each act to form the bubble by buying the asset believing that individually they can profit from the price increase and sell the asset before the value collapses.
To the extent this is an accurate model, asset-pricing bubbles can be analogized to what are referred to as p-beauty games. In the most common form of p-beauty games, each contestant chooses an integer in the interval [0,100]. The contestant who wins is the one who chooses the integer closest to the pmultiplied average of all chosen integers. A common choice for p in these studies is 2/3. Therefore, a contestant should not attempt to choose the average of the chosen numbers, but rather something smaller. The game theoretic Nash equilibrium strategy derived using infinite backward induction is zero. However, in experiments, this is not what occurs. (Camerer 2009 ). Often the modal choice is p times 50. 26 So here we see an example where individuals do not employ infinite backward induction of the type assumed in standard financial models and the optimal response in this situation is not to backwardly induct infinitely.
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Much like a p-beauty game, in asset pricing bubbles the optimal strategy is not to perform infinite calculations, but to backwardly induct only one step more than the average person. In the case of asset bubbles, this means "riding" the bubble, as long as the position is liquidated before the bubble collapses. Unfortunately, almost by definition the average market actor will not be able to do this. We could model this behavior by making an alteration to the stochastic discount factor. If there are not infinite periods, but only n-periods, then the investor has to believe only that the price of the asset will increase for n periods, instead of increasing for an infinite number of periods. Formally, the stochastic discount factor would become:
We note that the last term on the right hand side is the price of the asset at some finite time in the future, not an infinite sequence of dividends. This formula assumes expectations over the asset's market value at the time one wishes to sell the asset that may or may not reflect a reasonable discounted expected value of future cash flows of the asset. That is, because individuals are not making the calculations assumed in the argument against rational bubbles, the argument is inapplicable. Under our model of a modified stochastic discount factor, investors would behave as if they believe that markets are not rational in the sense of classic finance models and they are attempting to exploit this irrationality. Unfortunately, since by the nature of asset bubbles the average investor is caught in the collapse of the bubble, most investors are not able to carry out their investment strategy.
What happens both in repeat p-beauty games (Nagel 1995) as well as in asset pricing experiments is that individuals learn from their mistakes and that within a few periods, they are able to essentially utilize the rational strategy (choose a low integer or zero in the p-beauty game and not form asset bubbles). These experiments indicate that while market actors do not initially understand the implications of infinite backward induction, they can learn the implications over time.
One issue in bubble formation appears to be that individuals often learn not only from what happens to their investments, but also by what would have happened had they made different decisions. Lohrentz et al. (2007) . Therefore, seeing that the investor could have made better returns by investing in something else may be related to regret theory. Indeed, regret seems to play a significant role in human decision-making (Coricelli, Dolan and Sirigu 2007) , although fictive learning is in many ways a broader concept than regret.
28 Interestingly, Coricelli, Dolan and Sirigu argue that the attempt by individuals to minimize regret can actually result in the choices by players in games that converge to the rational solution of the game. One promising area of research may then be why certain individuals become involved in asset price bubbles while others do not and the extent to which fictive learning or regret may be involved.
d. Genetic and Hormonal Studies
Another interesting line of research in the neural basis of financial decision-making is that of conducting genetic studies on individuals who have been successful in financial markets. A key recent paper is by Sapra, Beavin and Zak (2012) . This study compared the genetic profiles of 60 Wall Street professionals to those of students in a business school. Sapra et al. found a much higher prevalence of particular variants of dopamine receptors (DRD4P and COMT) among successful traders than among the business students. 29 While this work is highly suggestive of genetic differences between successful Wall Street traders and business school students, what to make of these differences is unclear. We do not yet know how these receptors are helpful in allowing these traders to have longer careers as traders of financial assets. It would be interesting to study how these genes are related to different behaviors. For example, among business students with these genes do we observe different tastes for risk? Do they attend to information differently? 30 Answers to questions such as these would help us to directly relate this work to financial models.
There are a number of further questions in connection to this type of work, at least as currently conducted. We need to consider the difference between what makes someone want to be a trader and what makes someone successful at being a trader. With regard to this, we first note that the study did not compare successful professionals with students in business schools at the time the professionals went to business school, nor from the same business schools the professional attended. 31 Therefore, to view the differences found in the study as indicative of differences in the populations we have to assume that the students who attend business school now have essentially the same genetic makeup as those who attended business school years ago when these professionals went to school. In addition, we cannot assume that all of these business students were planning on becoming traders, which is actually a fairly specialized role even within the financial industry. There are many other areas that individuals focus on in business school. Furthermore even within finance there are large differences between various positions in financial firms. Therefore, we may not be able to separate out desire to be a trader from ability to perform as a trader at this stage.
Another recent study (Kuhnen and Chiao 2009) found that risk-taking appears to be correlated with certain genes. The authors found that genes that had previously been linked to emotional behavior, anxiety and addiction (5-HTTLPR as well DRD4) are correlated with risk-taking in investment decisions. They found that individuals who have the 5-HTTLPR s/s variant on average take on 28% less risk than those with s/l or l/l alleles. They also found that individuals with the DRD4 7-repeat allele took on 25% more risk than individuals without the 7-repeat version. 32 Again, it is unclear how these different receptors affect the decision-making process and why it may be that they affect risk-taking. Do they alter perceptions of probabilities, attitudes toward risk directly, some combination of the two or something else altogether?
A few other studies have examined the potential impact of genes on financial decisions. One particularly interesting study was done on identical twins in Sweden. This study found that 25% of the risk preferences in the portfolios as a result of a mandated change in retirement accounts in Sweden could be explained by differences in genetic makeup. (Cesarini et al. 2008) . In addition, one study found 30 There is some evidence that DRD4 is correlated with cognitive development. (Posner et al. 2012) 31 Of course, just as Heraclitus noted that one cannot step into the same river twice, one cannot sample from the same school in different years. However, one might imagine that the students attending the same business school in different years may well share characteristics in ways that one might not expect across schools. 32 Other studies have found that DRD4 7-repeat variant to be correlated with higher novelty-seeking scores than other DRD4 variants and are more likely to be found in pathological gamblers. One needs to be careful in drawing inferences about the effects of variants of the DRD4 gene on behavior. A meta-analysis of the studies concerning this gene found inconclusive evidence that the gene was correlated with novelty seeking (Munafo et al. 2008) .
that ambiguity aversion seems to have some genetic correlation as well. (Chew, Ebstein and Zhang 2012).
The genetic research discussed above indicates that the dopaminergic system may have a significant impact on financial decisions. The role played by the dopaminergic system in decision-making is highly complex. (Schultz 2009 ). For example, the dopaminergic system seems at certain frequencies of neural firing to encode reward prediction error and at other frequencies to encode expected value as well. The same cells appear to be involved in multiple levels of processing. This creates significant complexity in attempting to determine the effect of these receptors in the financial decision-making process. The problem of attempting to model systems that have processes that operate at very different time scales is sometimes referred to as the stiffness of the system. (Gockenbach 2010). This creates well-known problems for modeling and understanding the precise dynamics of decision-making. In particular, stiffness can cause models to be very sensitive to initial parameters, time scales of the dynamics, and a number of neural inputs in the model. If these are not carefully chosen, models can easily incorrectly predict dynamics.
Other research has indicated that other neurotransmitters may also play a role in investment decisions. Kuhen, Samarez-Larkin and Knutson (2011) found that individuals who possess the short version of the serotonin transporter gene have portfolios that are less heavily weighted in equities and have fewer credit lines. They suggest that these individuals may be trying to avoid situations in which they have to make complicated financial decisions. Of course, there are many other possible reasons for this relationship (e.g., differences in risk aversion, or level of interest in wealth creation).
The genetic studies relate to the question of whether it is learning by professionals that makes the difference or if those with good investment strategies ab initio are successful and therefore long-lived investment professionals. It is possible that successful traders are different to begin with because of their different genetic structure. Of course, the finding that there is indeed something different in the genetic make-up of successful Wall Street traders or those who take on more risk is in no way contradictory with standard economics. Economic models generally do not take a position on how preferences or abilities arise. Preferences and ability almost certainly have some genetic component. Observing different dopamine processing may tell us something about their decisions. However, at this point it is unclear how we can incorporate this knowledge into our models. This work does suggest that researchers should attempt to understand the mechanisms by which those genes act to create the preferences or abilities, or both, that translate into success in the financial market.
Another very interesting line of research deals with hormonal levels and trading decisions. It has been well established that hormonal levels can significant alter decisions. Churchland and Winkielmann (2012) discuss the regulatory effects of neuropeptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin. These neuropeptides and hormones seem to have a significant effect on the regulation of behavior.
Specifically as applied to financial markets, Coates and Herbert (2007) found that higher levels of testosterone in the morning correlated with trading success later that day. If hormones have a significant effect on trading activity, then given the relationship between hormones and weather, this may be a partial explanation of results that seem to correlate weather in the city of the market and the performance of the market. (Hirschliefer and Shumway 2003) Follow-up work by Coates and Page (2009) indicates that the higher returns observed due to higher levels of testosterone in the earlier study may be the result of a greater willingness to take on risk. They found that traders that have higher levels of testosterone did not in general make better choices, just riskier ones (as measured by the Sharpe Ratio). 33 In most financial models, greater risk is associated with higher expected value of returns, and so, because the results in Coates and Herbert (2007) were averaged over a large number of traders, it should not surprise us that, on average, traders who take on more risk have higher returns.
One potential upshot of the effect of hormones and other similar influences on decisions is that perhaps something along the lines of the random utility model provides the most accurate description of trader decisions. Glimcher (2011) That is, on any given day, variables other than economic news may affect the flow of market prices. Observed variables, such as prices and macroeconomic variables, are insufficient to predict behavior, and so we would have to include some unknown variables, which are essentially the same, from our perspective, as random variables. 34 Therefore, factors that are not generally thought to affect market prices might actually do so. Of course, to the extent that this is true, it is unclear why other market participants have not attempted to discover these variables and utilize this information to earn a profit, thus bringing markets back to efficiency, where market prices reflect the "true" value of the assets. While hormonal fluctuations can explain some elements of market price dynamics, such fluctuations are not likely to explain significant asset bubbles. Pricing bubbles in the stock market often last for years. It seems implausible that a significant portion of market actors sustains hormonal fluctuations for such a period of time.
If, as the genetic studies indicate, successful Wall Street professionals are neurologically different from the rest of the population, we might wish to focus experimental work on those who have these genetic features.
The question of what information and market mechanisms make it more or less likely for asset pricing bubbles to form in populations similar to those of market actors is clearly an important area of ongoing research. It appears that hormonal or dopaminergic stimulation alters risk aversion, and it might alter the perception of probabilities as well. Either of these changes can be seen to affect the stochastic discount factor. 35 On a cautionary note, McCullough, Churchland and Mendez (2013) discuss some of the problems with measurement of hormonal levels, which are of course crucial to determining 33 They did find that greater experience with the market did result in investors being able to obtain higher returns at lower risk (that is, their experience resulted in higher Sharpe ratios). 34 Interestingly, perhaps these additional variables might be indirectly included in models such as the Fama-French model (Fama and French 1993) if they affect the factors in the model. 35 Recall the key term in the stochastic discount factor is
which is likely to be affected by altering risk aversion, which is often measured by the ratio
. Furthermore, since the stochastic discount factor is an expected value, the alteration of the probabilities assigned to potential outcomes will likely affect this expected value.
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the effect of hormones and other neuroactive chemicals. They argue for caution in interpreting these studies given the difficulty in measuring some types of hormones and other bioactive chemicals.
e. Realized Utility
Another interesting line of work addresses the question of how individuals decide when to sell assets. A lot of behavioral research indicates that individuals hold assets that have experienced losses longer than they should based on a simple calculation of wealth maximization. Odean (1998) It has been long observed that so-called "paper" gains and losses are not treated in the same way as realized gains and losses (realized gains or losses are those from positions that have been sold or closed and so are no longer subject to market fluctuations), although standard economic models treat them the same.
Researchers often refer to this phenomenon as realized utility. Frydman et al. (2013) examine neural activity while the subjects chose whether to realize or defer gains and losses. They found that individuals had higher levels of activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum for realized gains than for so-called "paper" gains. The authors hypothesize that the reason individuals hold onto losing portfolios is that, even though this does not make sense in the context of the experiment, 36 individuals do not fully experience a gain or loss until recognized. A finding consistent with realized utility models is the commonly observed behavior that individual investors often trade too often. That is, individuals have a desire to trade assets that are currently returning a net gain because such a trade will increase their utility, even though there is little reason to believe that entering into a trade is advantageous in the long-run. This increase in utility arises because the sale ensures that the transaction will end with a gain, which appears to have additional value to the investor above and beyond the actual gain itself. Thus, these investors will incur high trading costs and enter into more trades than is optimal given standard preferences.
An important question is whether the neural mechanisms observed are used not only for decisions in these experiments, which can be closely analogized to day trading, or whether they also apply to longer term decisions such as whether to sell a house. While similar behavior has been observed in those circumstances as well (Genesove and Mayer 2001) , at this point we cannot be sure that this is the result of the same decision process.
Realized utility models relate to the stochastic discount factor in a complicated fashion. Here, the element of the model that is being changed is the utility function itself: ( ). In this case, the expected utility of continuing to invest once the security increases in value must overcome the utility of currently realizing the gain. One speculative idea is that optimism bias often observed in psychology studies (Griffin and Tversky 2000) might be balanced by realized utility in many situations so that together these two mental phenomena result in behavior that may be closer to that of a "rational" investor of standard finance theory.
F. Applications
Neuroeconomic research on financial decisions has numerous implications for legal scholarship. For example, whether individuals use standard expected utility or something closer to realized utility can have implications for the taxation of investment income. Under the standard economic theory of income taxation (Simons 1938 ) unrealized gains should be taxed in the same way that realized gains are. If individuals treat realized gains differently than "paper" gains, one might argue that these two types of gains should be taxed differently. Chorvat (2003) If the tax system taxed both types of gains in the same way, individuals would undervalue assets that create paper gains because their tax cost would be the same as assets they value more highly, i.e. those that give realized gains. The tax system would then differentially discourage investment in assets that are more likely to create "paper" gains in the near term as compared to assets that give immediate realized payoffs.
In addition, understanding how financial investment decisions are made can have obvious impacts in the regulation of securities markets. Of course, the most attention-grabbing applications would involve rules to inhibit asset price bubble formation. Interestingly, the research in this area indicates that experienced investors behave differently given the same information. Such findings indicate that information disclosure may be insufficient to foster efficient markets. Indeed, the bubble experiments indicate that experience itself may be necessary to prevent asset bubbles. Unfortunately, experience is not something that can be legislated. Furthermore, it does not seem that learning about bubbles in some abstract way prepares individuals to deal with them in the market (Greenwood and Nagel 2009) . If the disclosure of information is not sufficient to help investors, regulators need to consider what type of interventions will foster better actions by investors. Unfortunately, detecting bubbles in financial markets is often difficult (Gurkaynak 2005) .
Further research in this area might examine whether participation in asset price bubble experiments might alter the way that investors perceive real investment choices. That is, is it possible to give market participants simulated experience that might allow them to make better investment choices in the future? The research done on fictive learning indicates that individuals do not necessarily have to experience losses but merely the possibility of losses in order to learn about markets. If this is possible, it suggests that regulators should require this type of training of at least some market participants.
The genetic studies on investment behavior indicate that further research should perhaps take into account the types of individuals being studied as compared to the types of individuals the legal system hopes it might influence. Perhaps research on bubbles should focus on those who are most like market actors in order to understand what information and institutions will reduce the likelihood of asset pricing bubbles. Furthermore, by better understanding what information successful Wall Street professionals attend to, legal rules can help make this information more salient to other market participants.
Of course, concern with financial markets is not focused only on mitigating the effects of asset price bubbles. One of the goals of the legal system is to ensure the quick dissemination of information to aid efficient pricing in markets. The work of Bruguier et al. indicates that the effect of information can be disseminated without the information itself being disseminated. This might reduce concern over information disclosure. However, information must still be disseminated to a reasonable segment of the market in order for this effect to operate.
The studies showing that priming of the dopaminergic system indicate that the disclosures and required paperwork necessary before investing may have value, even if individuals do not retain or understand the information they are given. By subjecting individuals to a non-excitatory stimuli, they may be reducing the over-stimulated dopaminergic state, a state that might trigger an individual to be overly willing to take on risk. This suggests that investor protections may be effective for reasons different from those that motivated their adoption.
Conclusion
This essay argues that neuroeconomic research should attempt to focus on standard models that relate to the behavior being studied. Focusing on such models will help to focus the research as well as suggest profitable extensions of the research. The improved models will help us to better understand and craft legal rules and institutions.
